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Parratt v. Taylor: Limitations on the Parratt Analysis
in Section 1983 Actions
In Parralt v. Taylor,1 a 1981 case, the United States Supreme
Court significantly modified due process analysis in section 1983 federal actions. 2 Section 1983 provides relief for the deprivation of any
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution which has
been caused by any person acting under color of law.3 If, for example, an individual took another's automobile, he would deprive that
person of his property interest in the car. However, he would violate
section 1983 only if: 1) he had acted under color of law, and 2) he
had not given the owner of the cat due process of law (a meaningful
chance to protect his property interest and voice his position) in conjunction with the deprivation. 4 This second element is critical because the fourteenth amendment does not guard against all
deprivations of property; rather, it protects individuals only from
deprivations conducted without due process of law. 5 At the time of
the Parratt decision, section 1983 actions had become an increasingly
large segment of the federal court docket and a burden on those
courts.

6

Parratt has become a major decision in the section 1983 field be1 451 U.S. 527 (1981). The opinion is discussed at Part I tnfia, notes 21-67 infra and
accompanying text.
2 Id.
3 Section 1983 reads, in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. V 1981).
4 Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 535 (1981).
5 The fourteenth amendment provides, in relevant part:
No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without dueprocessoflaw; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1 (emphasis added).
6 One cannot establish a direct causation between the number of section 1983 claims
brought in federal court and the Supreme Court's Parratt decision. Nevertheless, the large
volume of cases and the resulting problems have been well documented. See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 5-12, 26-30 (1980); see also Parratt,451 U.S. at 554 n.13;
Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1065 n.4 (6th Cir. 1983).
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cause, although it did not alter the previous analysis, it redefined the
threshold issue for establishing a section 1983 claim. 7 In Parrall, the
Court held that when the State provides an adequate tort remedy for
the deprivation, even though the remedial process comes a substantial time after the deprivation has occurred, the state remedy itself
constitutes all the necessary due process required by the fourteenth
amendment. 8 Therefore, in such cases, there is no deprivation of a
protected interest without due process, and, accordingly, a section
1983 action will not lie. 9
The federal courts have utilized the Parratt approach for three
years, dismissing certain section 1983 actions when it has appeared
that an adequate existing state procedure could remedy the deprivation. 10 However, Parratt has precipitated at least three conflicts. The
first concerns whether Parratt can be reconciled with Patsy v. Board of
Regents," a post-Parratt decision wherein the Supreme Court reaffirmed that section 1983 plaintiffs need not first exhaust all possible
state remedies before pursuing a section 1983 action in federal
court. 12 Although an exhaustion requirement is analytically distinguishable from the Parralt approach, both positions can yield the
13
same result.
The second and third conflicts concern the scope of Parratt'sapplication. Factually, Parratt dealt only with the deprivation of property interests.' 4 Nevertheless, its approach seems to apply equally to
all interests protected by the fourteenth amendment, thus additionally encompassing life and liberty interests.' 5 Furthermore, conflict
exists as to whether both negligent and intentional actions will fall
within the Parratt analysis. 6 While Parratt discussed only negligent
deprivations of property rights, some courts have extended the Parrat
7 The full scope of Parratt'rreach has yet to be determined. Although it applies to
constitutional torts as a general category, Parts III and IV will discuss both its potential
application and its justifiable application. Recently, the Supreme Court extended the Parrait
analysis to intentional deprivations of property. See note 121 infla.
8 Parfall, 451 U.S. at 543-44.
9 Id at 544.
10 See, e.g., Haygood v. Younger, 718 F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1983).
11 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
12 Id at 516.
13 An exhaustion requirement recognizes a federal action but delays its entry into a federal forum. Paratt, in appropriate circumstances, defeats the federal action entirely. However, both effectively relegate the plaintiff to state court. See notes 69-72 infra and
accompanying text.
14 Parralt,451 U.S. at 529, n.1.
15 See notes 102-109 infa and accompanying text.
16 See notes 121-136 infra and accompanying text.
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17
analysis to encompass intentional actions as well.
Part I of this note examines the contours of the Parratl opinion.
Part II identifies the source of the conflict between Parralt and the
rejection of an exhaustion requirement. It examines Parratt'sholding

in light of not only Patsy, a post-Parratt decision, but also Monroe v.
Pape,18 the pre-Parratt decision which some commentators suggest is
responsible for today's large-scale use of section 1983.19 Part III analyzes whether Parrattpertains only to property interests or whether it
should be expanded to cover life and liberty interests as well. In this
regard, Part III considers Ingraham v. Wr'ght,2 0 a pre-Parratt case
which applied a Parratt-likeanalysis to the liberty interest implicated

by corporal punishment in public schools. Part IV discusses the relative merits of limiting Parratt to n~gligent conduct or allowing it to
encompass both negligent and intentional deprivations of due process rights. Part V offers suggestions for the practitioner. It outlines
the Parrattdue process analysis currently being applied and discusses
the most recent pleading requirements in section 1983 actions. Part
VI concludes by suggesting that only a limited application of Parratt
can be justified if the Supreme Court desires to harmonize Parratt
with its other due process jurisprudence.
I.

The Contours and Highlights of Parralt

Parrattv. Taylor 21 effectively resolved the problems presented by
the vast number of constitutional tort2 2 cases brought in federal
court; 23 it did so by redefining what constitutes the deprivation of a
protected interest without due process of law.2 4 Under traditional
17
18
19

See notes 121 and 124 infra and accompanying text.
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
Whitman, supra note 6, at 5-7.

20 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
21 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
22 International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness v. City of Evanston, 89 Ill. App. 3d 701,
411 N.E.2d 1030 (1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878 (1981), defines "constitutional tort" as
follows:
The term has been used to describe an area of the law encompassing that which is
not quite a private (common law) tort, but which contains tort elements; it is not a
"constitutional law" matter per se, but it employs a constitutional test. Involved in
such a claim is an alleged deprivation of one of the rights secured by the Constitution (the tort) by one acting under color of State law.
Id at 707, 411 N.E.2d at 1036 (citations omitted).
23 See note 6 supra.
24 The Court also suggests that the burden on the federal courts could have been somewhat relieved had Congress added a minimum dollar limitation on 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (Supp.
V 1981), the predicate for federal court jurisdiction in this matter. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 529.
The total loss alleged in this case was only $23.50. Id
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analysis, an individual's due process rights were violated if he was
denied the opportunity to voice his opinions and protect his interests
in life, liberty, or property prior to the government action which impaired those protected interests. 25 Parralt delays the necessary process
until a state tort action can be initiated, 26 thus allaying the fears of
some in the judiciary that "every alleged injury which may have
been inflicted by a state official acting under 'color of law' [would
turn] into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment cognizable
under § 1983."27
In Parratt, a prison inmate sued prison administrators under section 1983,28 claiming that prison employees negligently lost hobby
materials which he had ordered. 29 The inmate filed this federal action even though Nebraska's tort claims procedure would have provided him relief 3 0 Justice Rehnquist, speaking for the Court, held
that the Nebraska tort remedies were "sufficient to satisfy the re32
quirements of due process" 3' and denied the section 1983 claim.
The Court began its opinion by considering the elements of a
section 1983 action. It said that to state a claim under section 1983, a
plaintiff must meet two requirements.3 3 First, the alleged conduct
must have been committed by a person acting under color of state
law. 34 In Parratt, the Court did not question the satisfaction of this
35
requirement; it simply cited to its earlier holding in Monroe v. Pape
which expansively defined the phrase "under color of law."' 36 Sec25 J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, &J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 559 (1983) Exceptions
to this rule are found for emergency or public health cases, specific replevin actions (see note
82 infra and accompanying text), and certain property rights (see Part III infia).

26 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 544.
27 Id
28 See note 3 supra.
29 The loss occurred at the Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex. The hobby
materials arrived at the prison and two employees (one civilian, one inmate) signed for them.
The respondent was in segregation detention at the time; when he was released and able to
receive the packages, they could not be found. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 529-30.
30 Id at 530.
31 The Court said: "The remedies provided could have fully compensated the respondent for the property loss he suffered, and we hold that they are sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process." Id at 544. With repect to this remedy, it is also interesting that
the Court noted: "[A]though the state remedies may not provide the respondent with all the
relief which may have been available under § 1983, that does not mean that the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due process." Id See also Smith v. Wade,
103 S. Ct. 1625 (1983) (in a proper case, punitive damages may be available under § 1983.).
32 Parfai, 451 U.S. at 544.
33 Id at 535.
34 Id.
35 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
36 Monroe reaffirmed the definition of "under color of law" which was given in United
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ond, the alleged conduct must have deprived a person of "rights,
privileges or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the
United States. '3 7 In Parratt, the alleged deprivation was of a property
interest secured by the fourteenth amendment. However, since the
fourteenth amendment only protects against deprivations committed
without due process, 38 the Court turned to a determination of
39
whether the prisoner received due process from the state.
Due process analysis presupposes two types of hearings: a
predeprivation hearing afforded before the state impairs a life, liberty, or property interest, 4° and a postdeprivation hearing following
the government's impairment of rights. 4 1 In most cases, the normal
predeprivation hearing will satisfy the requirements of due process because the deprivation is "pursuant to some established state procedure
and 'process' [can] be offered before any actual deprivation" takes
place. 42 But, the Parratt Court has also determined that in some
cases, postdeprivation procedures will also satisfy due process requirements. 43 The cases where postdeprivation process has been allowed
States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941) and affirmed in Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91
(1945). The Classic Court said: "[m~isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made
possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
'under color of' state law." Classic, 313 U.S. at 326. This definition is firmly rooted in the
Court's jurisprudence. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312 (1981). In Polk County, the
plaintiff alleged that Shepard, an attorney in the Polk County Offender Advocate's office,
had failed to represent him adequately in an appeal by withdrawing as counsel because his
claims were frivolous. The Court found that Shepard did not act under color of law.
Polk County is novel in that it adopted a "functional" color of law test. Although the
employment relationship will be a relevant factor, it is not the sole factor in determining
whether an individual acts "under color of law." Id at 321. In Polk County, the public defender's "functions and obligations were in no way dependent on state authority." Id at 318.
An argument could be made which would remove Parrat and like cases from "under color of
law" by suggesting that when a prison employee loses a package or commits similar negligent
harm, he is not acting with special power or authority vested only by the state.
37 Parfat, 451 U.S. at 535.
38 See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
39 In outlining the two necessary elements for a § 1983 action, the Court rejected any
state of mind requirement. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 534. In so doing, the Court again relied on
Monroe as support that negligence is sufficient to state a claim under § 1983:
[l]t is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed was to afford a
federal right in federal courts because, by reason of prejudice, passion, neglect . ..,
state laws might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment of
rights, privileges and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment might
be denied by the state agencies.
Id at 534-35 (emphasis added).
40 Id at 537.
41 Id at 538.
42 Id at 537 (emphasis added).
43 Id at 538.
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"recognize that either the necessity of quick action by the State or
the impracticality of providing any meaningful predeprivation process" is a proper predicate for looking to a meaningful postdeprivation remedy in due process analysis. 44 Notably, in constitutional tort
cases, a meaningful predeprivation hearing is at best impractical,
and very often impossible. The Parratt approach, then, requires a
predeprivation hearing when the deprivation is the result of an established state procedure; however, in cases of emergency or where a
predeprivation hearing is impractical, an adequate postdeprivation
45
remedy will satisfy due process.

Given this perspective, the Parratt Court assumed that a court
must consider the total state action, both before and after the deprivation, to determine whether due process has been afforded. 46 This
assumption is pivotal, for it precludes basing a violation upon the
initial deprivation alone. In acknowledging this point, the Parratt
Court said: "We may reasonably conclude, therefore, that the existence of an adequate state remedy to redress property damage inflicted by state officers avoids the conclusion that there has been any
constitutional deprivation of property without due process of law
.... 47 The facts of Parratt presented a classic example of a deprivation without the denial of due process. The alleged deprivation,
loss of the prisoner's hobby materials, did not result from an "established state procedure. '48 Rather, the loss occurred as a "result of a
44 Id at 539. For a considerably different characterization of the cases allowing
postdeprivation process, see Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972):
Only in a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure without
opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case, the seizure has been directly
necessary to secure an important governmental or general public interest. Second,
there has been a special need for very prompt action. Third, the state has kept strict
control over its monopoly of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has
been a government official responsible for determining, under the standards of a
narrowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular instance, Thus, the Court has allowed summary seizure of property to collect the
internal revenue of the United States, to meet the needs of economic disaster of a
bank failure, and to protect the public from misbranded drugs and contaminated
food.
Fuentes, 407 U.S. at 90-92 (footnotes omitted).
45 See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
46 This policy assumption is unstated by the Court. Nevertheless, the assumption is essential if the Court is to allow state postdeprivation remedies to satisfy due process and defeat
a § 1983 cause of action.
47 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 542 (quoting Bonner v. Coughlin, 517 F.2d 1311, 1319 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 932 (1978)).
48 Parrat, 451 U.S. at 541. Actually, the prison employees deviated from the normal
procedure in which no inmate other than the recipient would sign for the package. Id at 530.
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random and unauthorized act by state employees. '49 As in most tort
cases, the prison officials in Parralt could not precisely predict when
any loss would occur. The Court thus examined the postdeprivation
process to determine whether due process had been afforded the injured party. 50
The Supreme Court clarified and affirmed the Parratt opinion
one year later in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. 5 1 In Logan, the Court
explained that Parratt applies only in situations that require the state
to act quickly, or where it could not otherwise provide predeprivation process. 52 The Court said that under no circumstances would
postdeprivation process satisfy due process when the deprivation was
53
effectuated through an established state procedure.
In Logan, the Court distinguished Parratt by emphasizing that
the tortious loss in Parratt was the result of a random and unauthorized act. 54 The property loss in Logan, however, resulted from an
established state procedure. 55 In Logan, the Illinois Fair Employment
49 Id at 541. Parrattapparently is not limited to state employees but extends to federal
employees as well. In Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct.
725 (1983), a case once remanded for consideration in light of Paralt, the defendant (Lehman) was a Forest Service employee. Thus, inferentially, the Supreme Court applied Parratt
to federal employees.
The Court of Appeals defeated the § 1983 action since the plaintiff would have had an
adequate remedy under the Federal Tort Claims Act. A dissent suggested that Parrattshould
not be used to weigh between two federal forums.
50 Parfait, 451 U.S. at 543-44.
51 455 U.S. 422 (1982). In Logan, Zimmerman Brush Co. discharged the plaintiff purportedly because his short left leg made it impossible for him to continue as a shipping clerk.
Logan brought his unlawful discharge complaint to the Illinois Fair Employment Practices
Commission. However, the Commission, apparently through inadvertence, scheduled the
necessary conference for five days after the expiration of the statutory limitation period for
claims. The Illinois Supreme Court held that Logan's claim was thereby extinguished. The
United States Supreme Court reversed.
52 The Court said that "absent 'the necessity of quick action by the State or the impracticality of providing any predeprivation process,' a postdeprivation hearing here would be constitutionally inadequate." Id at 436.
53 In Logan the Court said: "Unlike the complaint in Parratt, Logan is challenging not
the Commission's error, but the 'established state procedure' that destroys his entitlement
without according him proper procedural safeguards." Id
54 The Logan Court stated:
In Parfait, the Court emphasized that it was dealing with "a tortious loss of...
property as a result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee... not
a result of some established state procedure." Here, in contrast, it is the state system
itself that destroys a complainant's property interest, by operation of law, whenever
the [Illinois Fair Employment Practices Commission] fails to convene a timely conference-whether the Commission's action is taken through negligence, maliciousness, or otherwise. Parfaitwas not designed to reach such a situation.
Id at 435-36 (emphasis added).
55 Id
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Practices Commission inadvertently scheduled a conference on the
plaintiff's fair employment charge for five days past the statutory
limitation period, thereby depriving him of his complaint.5 6 The loss
to Logan, then, happened by operation of law. The Court clearly
57
stated that "Parrati was not designed to reach such a situation."
Much confusion has arisen in the courts of appeals with respect
to the extent of Parratt- applicability. 58 The seeds of this confusion
are found in the concurring opinions in Parratt. Justice Blackmun,
concurring with Justice White, read the majority opinion narrowly,
limiting it to cases involving unintentional deprivations of property
interests.5 9 According to Justice Blackmun, the Parratt decision
would not include deprivations of life or liberty, nor would
postdeprivation process suffice in any case of intentional deprivation.6 0 Unfortunately, neither Justice Blackmun nor Justice White
offered an authority or rationale for his statements.
However, Ingraham v. Wn'ght, 6 1 a pre-Parratt case dealing with
corporal punishment, may lessen the importance of Justice Blackmun's remarks with respect to liberty interests. In Ingraham, the
Court applied a Parratt-typeanalysis to a liberty interest in personal
safety.6 2 The Court found that corporal punishment in public
schools implicates a constitutionally protected liberty interest. 63 But,
the Court held that the traditional common law remedies against
teachers and school administrators are fully adequate to afford due
process. 64 As in Panratt, these common law remedies are postdeprivation remedies.
In summary, Parratiset the stage for the controversy which now
prevails. In the face of a growing number of section 1983 claims in
federal courts, Parratt, in effect, permitted more claims by holding
that negligence may be sufficient to state a claim under section
1983.65 However, Parratl also held that in situations where
predeprivation process is impractical, an adequate postdeprivation
56 Id at 426.
57 Id at 436.
58 Se Parts III-IV infra.
59 Parratt, 451 U.S. at 545-46.
60 Id.
61 430 U.S. 651 (1977). In Ingraham, several junior high school students filed charges
seeking damages and equitable relief as a result of alleged harm due to excessive disciplinary
corporal punishment. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the charges.
62 Id. at 674.
63 Id. at 672.
64 Id.
65 See note 122 infia and accompanying text.
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state remedy will afford sufficient due process. 66 In allowing a
postdeprivation remedy to suffice, the Court assumed that all state
action, both before and after the deprivation, must be treated as one
67
transaction for due process analysis.
II. The Exhaustion Requirement In Light of Parrall
A considerable theoretical difference exists between an exhaustion requirement and the holding in Parratt v. Taylor.68 Under Parratt,
a section 1983 claim will be defeated if the State provides an adequate
postdeprivation remedy through which the plaintiff can seek relief. 69
Conversely, an exhaustion requirement begins by recognizing the section 1983 cause of action, but simply compels the section 1983 plaintiff to pursue all appropriate state remedies before entering federal
court. 70 At its worst, an exhaustion requirement would delay the fed7t
eral action; it would not, however, defeat it.

Although theoretically different, both Parralt and an exhaustion
requirement have the same net effect. An exhaustion requirement
forces the plaintiff to seek relief in state court. Initial recourse to a
federal forum is foreclosed even if the state itself inflicted the harm.
66 See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
67 See notes 46-47 supra and accompanying text. In Parratt, the Court revised its definition of due process because the Court believed the state remedies were sufficient to make
recourse to the federal courts unnecessary. Notably, the Court has adopted this approach in
considering securities law. At least twice the Court has refused to expand its definition of
"security" because federal securities law was unnecessary to regulate the instrument. In International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979), the Court refused to expand the
Securities Act to include employee pension plans because the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 88 Stat. 829 (1974), was designed to encompass pension plans.
Id. at 569-70. In Marine Bank v. Weaver, 455 U.S. 551 (1982), the Court refused to include a
bank Certificate of Deposit within the definition of a security and said: "It is unnecessary to
subject issuers of bank certificates of deposit to liability under the antifraud provisions of the
federal securities laws since the holders of bank certificates of deposit are abundantly protected under federal banking laws." Id. at 559.
68 For a contrary opinion, see Juncker v. Tinney, 549 F. Supp. 574, 578 (D. Md. 1982); see
also, Smolla, The Displacement of FederalDue Process Claims By State Tort Remedies, 1982 U. ILL.
L. REv. 831, 863-68 (1982). Professor Smolla believes that the "post-deprivation concept"
can be reconciled with the rejection of an exhaustion requirement. Id. at 863. His article
traces the history of the "post-deprivation due process concept" and concludes that its use
"could render the Supreme Court's whole approach to procedural due process more flexible
and coherent." Id at 835.
69 See note 31 supra and accompanying text.
70 "[Exhaustion] does not defeat federal-court jurisdiction, it merely defers it. It permits
the States to correct violations through their own procedures, and it encourages the establishment of such procedures." Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 532-33 (1982) (Powell, J.
dissenting) (footnotes and citations omitted). See also Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062, 1064
n.3 (6th Cir. 1983).
71 See note 70supra.
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Similarly, Parraal forces the plaintiff to seek relief in state courts by
denying access to a federal forum specifically because the plaintiff
could have sought relief from the state. With both Parratt and an
exhaustion requirement, then, section 1983 plaintiffs must seek relief
from the state. As such, Parratt and the rejection of an exhaustion re72
quirement for section 1983 actions are simply inconsistent.
Three Supreme Court opinions, Monroe v. PapFe,73 Puentes v.
Shevin ,74 and Patsy v. BoardofRegents ,7 substantiate the irreconcilable
differences between the Court's approach in Parrattand the rationale
underlying the rejection of an exhaustion requirement. Monroe v.
Pape, decided twenty years before Parratt,concerned a damage action
76
for an illegal home invasion by thirteen Chicago police officers.
Monroe is important for its expansive reading of "under color of
law" 77 and additionally for two points relevant to exhaustion requirements. First, the Court stated that once a plaintiff proves a deprivation 78 and the conduct causing the deprivation satisfies the
requirements of "under color of law," the plaintiff has stated a cause
of action and must be afforded access to a federal forum. 79 The existence of an adequate state remedy is unimportant. 80 Notably, this
position finds support in the Supreme Court's series of cases dealing
with state replevin statutes. In Fuentes v. Shevin,81 the first of the series, the Court stated that "a temporary, nonfinal deprivation of
property is nonetheless a 'deprivation' in the terms of the Fourteenth
Amendment. ' 82 Therefore, even though there may be a tort remedy
72 The rejection of an exhaustion requirement means that § 1983 plaintiffs need never
resort to state courts. Parralt forces potential § 1983 plaintiffs to use only the state courts. It
accomplishes this by defeating the federal cause of action. This tactic is impermissible in light
of the legislative history of § 1983.
73 365 U.S. 167 (1961).

74 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
75 457 U.S. 496 (1982).
76 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 169.
77 See note 36 supra. The Parratt Court relied on Monroe for its definition of "under color
of law." Parrai, 451 U.S. at 535.
78 The type of deprivations referred to in Monroe would be "initial" deprivations in Parrail's terms.

79
80
afford
81
82

Monroe, 365 U.S. at 170, 172, 187.
Id at 183. The Monroe Court acknowledged that Illinois had a remedy sufficient to
the petitioners full redress for their harm. Id at 172.
407 U.S. 67 (1972).
Id

at 85. The continued validity of Flentes is questionable. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant

Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974), seems to have abandoned much of the rationale which Fuentes stood
on. However, one year later, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601
(1975), apparently gave new life to Fuentes. Yet, even assuming that Mitchell replaced Fuentes
as the controlling precedent in terms of postdeprivation remedies, the ParraltCourt fares no
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subsequent to the deprivation, that possibility cannot change the
character of the initial deprivation. Thus, both Monroe and Fuentes
reject Parralt's assumption8 3 that postdeprivation state remedies can
transform an initial deprivation into a constitutionally harmless act
which does not violate due process.
Second, Monroe stated that even if a state remedy exists, it need
not be exhausted since the federal remedy was designed to supplement the state remedy.8 4 The Court succinctly stated:
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced wouldgive relief.
Thefederal remedy is supplementag to the state remedy, and the latter need
not befirst sought andrefused before thefederal one is invoked Hence the

fact that Illinois by its constitution and laws outlaws unreasonable searches and seizures is no barrier to the present suit. 85
Monroe, then, clearly supports the rejection of an exhaustion requirement. 86 The same rationale in Monroe which defeats an exhaustion
requirement, however, also undercuts the Parratt Court's policy decision to limit certain constitutional tort cases to state courts.8 7 Parrait
is simply inconsistent with the purpose of section 1983 as outlined in
Monroe .88

Patsy v. Board of Regents,89 a post-Parratt case, also suggests that

Parratt cannot comfortably coexist with the rejection of an exhaustion requirement. Patsy is the most recent of the numerous decisions
better. The Mitchell court only advocated the postdeprivation process because the subsequent
hearing was immediate. Mitchell, 416 U.S. at 611, 618. "Under Louisiana procedure, however, the debtor, Mitchell, was not left in limbo to await a hearing that might or might not
'eventually' occur ....
Louisiana law expressly provides for an immediate hearing and dissolution of the writ 'unless the plaintiff proves the grounds upon which the writ was issued.' "
Id at 618 (emphasis added) (citation omitted). Obviously, in a Parrat situation, requiring
the injured party to initiate a state tort remedy does not afford an immediate hearing.
Mitchell can also be distinguished from Fuentes because the Mitchell Court emphasized
that both the plaintiff and the defendant had interests in the property. No such situation
exists in Parratt.
83 See note 46 supra and accompanying text.
84 Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
85 Id (emphasis added).
86 In analyzing "under color of law," the Monroe court realized that for § 1983 actions,
recourse to a state forum was at best supplementary but never mandatory. As such, it supports the rejection of an exhaustion requirement.
87 Obviously, given the predicate offense of a deprivation under color of law where no
recourse to the state courts is required, Parrattcannot consistently support a definition of due
process which defeats a federal action by simply making recourse to the state an element
affecting whether the deprivation in fact occurred.
88 This tension was mentioned in Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435, 1454 (7th Cir.
1983) (dissenting opinion). For contrary opinions, see note 68 supra.
89 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Georgia Patsy alleged that her employer, Florida International
University, had denied her employment opportunities solely on the basis of race and sex.
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in which the Supreme Court has rejected an exhaustion requirement
for section 1983 actions. 90 In Patsy, a case alleging race and sex discrimination, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit imposed a
requirement that section 1983 plaintiffs exhaust any "adequate and
appropriate" administrative remedies. 9 ' In doing so, the court
adopted a five point test to determine whether a state remedy was
adequate and appropriate. 92 Rejecting the Fifth Circuit's decision,
the Supreme Court quoted extensively from the legislative history in
support of section 1983 and said:
The 1871 Congress intended [section 1983] to "throw open the
doors of the United States courts" to individuals who were
threatened with, or who had suffered, the deprivation of constitutional rights, and to provide these individuals immediate access to the
9

federal courts notwithstandingany provision of state law to the contrary.

The legislative history of section 1983 therefore indicates that someone who has been deprived of a protected interest by the state need
never enter a state court to obtain relief or redress. 94 In fact, many
legislators thought section 1983 would provide concurrent forums in
the state and federal systems, allowing a plaintiff to choose between
them.95
90 Patty, 457 U.S. at 500, 516. See a/so McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671
(1963).
91 Patsy, 457 U.S. at 498.
92 The Fifth Circuit had held that before bringing a federal action, a plaintiff must exhaust state remedies with the following five characteristics:
1) the state remedy must provide for an orderly system of review or appeal;
2) the agency administering the remedy can grant relief approximately commensurate with
the claim;
3) relief is available within a reasonable time;
4) the procedures are fair, not unduly burdensome, and not used to harass or discourage
those with legitimate claims; and
5) interim relief is available to prevent irreparable injury during the process.
Where the above five requirements are met, "a court must further consider the particular
administrative scheme, the nature of the plaintiff's interest, and the values served by the
exhaustion doctrine in order to determine whether exhaustion should be required." Id at
499.
93 Id at 504 (quoting remarks of Rep. Lowe, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 376
(1871)). Section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 was the precursor to § 1983.
94 Furthermore, opponents of the bill gave it the same reading and specifically criticized
it on this very point:
[Section 1983] does not even give the State courts a chance to try questions, or to
show whether they will try the questions that might come before them under the
first section of the fourteenth amendment, fairly or not. It takes the whole question
away from them in the beginning.
Patsy, 457 U.S. at 505 n.7 (quoting remarks of Rep. Storm, CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st
Sess., App. 86 (1871)).
95 Patsy, 457 U.S. at 506.
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Patsy, then, further demonstrates the confusion in the Supreme
Court's analysis. The Court has consistently held that a section 1983
plaintiff need not enter a state court or exhaust state relief.9 6 The
Parralt Court reversed this position by requiring an injured party to
enter state court even though the state itself inflicted the injury. Parraft accomplished this by manipulating the definition of due process
to make a federal alternative impossible. 9 7 The Patsy decision later
rejected an exhaustion requirement again, thus undercutting the rationale behind Parratt.
Parralt is an anomaly. By denying a federal forum because state
remedies are available, Parratt is inconsistent with Monroe and Patsy
which have both considered the exhaustion requirement question. 9
This inconsistency arises only because of the way Parratt defined due
96 See notes 85, 93, and 94 supra and accompanying text.
97 See notes 31 and 47 supra and accompanying text.
98 Two other notable inconsistencies have been sparked by Parait o. Taylor. The first
inconsistency centers around the similarity between the majority's result in Parrattand Justice
Frankfurter's dissent in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 202-59. Parrattheld that an adequate
postdeprivation remedy would suffice for due process as long as the constitutional tort was not
pursuant to an established state procedure or done by the State with such forethought that
there was time for predeprivation process. With only a few variations, this was also the result
reached by Justice Frankfurter in his dissent in Monroe. Parralt is inconsistent in that it
reaches a result similar to that of the Monroe dissent, yet adopts the Monroe majority's definition of "under color of law." Parrall, 451 U.S. at 535. Justice Frankfurter reached his result
by offering a new understanding of "under color of law." He believed that "all the evidence
converges to the conclusion that Congress by [§ 1983] created a civil liability enforceable in
the federal courts only in instances of injury for which redress was barred in the state courts
because some 'statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage' sanctioned the grievance complained of." Monroe, 365 U.S. at 237 (Frankfurter, J. dissenting). In essence, unless there is
some affirmative state pronouncement (much like Paratt's"established state procedure") or
well-confirmed custom which caused the deprivation, the ensuing government action would
not be under color of law and thus would not be a proper subject of a § 1983 action.
Justice Frankfurter stated:
If a plaintiff can show that defendant is acting pursuant to the specific terms of a
state statute, [§ 1983] will apply. If he can show that defendant's conduct is within
the range of executive discretion in the enforcement of a state statute, or municipal
ordinance, [§ 1983] will apply. Beyond these cases will lie the admittedly more difficult ones in which he seeks to show some "'custom or usage' which has become
common law."
Id. at 246 (citations and footnote omitted). He continued:
As to the adequacy of state-court protection of person and property, there seems a
very sound distinction, as a class, between injuries sanctioned by state law (as to
which there can never be state-court redress, if at all, unless (1) the state courts are
sufficiently receptive to a federal claim to declare their own law unconstitutional, or
(2) the litigant persists through a tortuous and protracted process of appeals, after a
state trial court has found the facts, through the state-court system to this Court)
and injuries not sanctioned by state law. To make this line of distinction determine
the incidence of Civil Rights legislation serves to cover the bulk of cases where federal judicial protection would be needed.
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process in constitutional tort actions. If the Parratt Court had not
included postdeprivation state remedies as an integral part of its determination as to whether due process has been afforded an injured
party, Parrattwould not have run afoul of the underlying rationale in
Fuentes and the legislative history of section 1983. Both before and
after Parratt, the Court has given the legislative history of section
1983 consistent readings. Parratt,however, rejects the stated intent of
the legislators.
Id. at 249-50.
Thus, Frankfurter's definition of "under color of law" encompassed only those violations
which were pursuant to an established state procedure. All other violations could not be
brought under § 1983 because they did not meet the "under color of law" test. Parrall left
§ 1983 and its "under color of law" test intact. However, it defeated "non-established procedure" actions by adjusting the definition of due process to take into account postdeprivation
state remedies, a position expressly contrary to the legislative intent behind § 1983.
The second inconsistency arises because of the difference in degree between the harm in
Parrall and the type of harm sought to be corrected by § 1983. Section 1983 "was enacted to
deter real abuses by state officials in the exercise of governmental powers." Parrall,451 U.S. at
549 (emphasis added). Arguably, the conduct alleged in Parratshould not have fallen under
the scope of § 1983. Section 1983 was intended, in part, to provide a federal remedy where
state law provided a theoretically adequate remedy which was not available in practice. See
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174; see also note 99 infra and accompanying text. As the Congress contemplated this federal remedy, it was primarily attempting to curb the abuses brought by the
Ku Klux Klan in the South. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174-75. (Although the existence of the Ku
Klux Klan motivated § 1983, the statute actually aimed at those state agents who were unwilling or unable to carry out their duties because of the Klan's strong influence.) The legislative history of § 1983 contains the following example of the type of harm Congress sought to
correct:
If every sheriff in South Carolina refuses to serve a writ for a colored man and
those sheriffs are kept in office year after year by the people of South Carolina, and
no verdict against them for their failure of duty can be obtained before a South
Carolina jury, the State of South Carolina. . . has denied that protection.
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 177. The negligent loss of hobby materials valued at $23.50 in Parratt
seems quite removed from the intentional and pervasive refusal to serve writs as suggested in
the previous example. By placing the trivial loss and alleged conduct in Parrat within § 1983,
the Parratt Court misses the mark. In terms of degree, one must incredibly stretch § 1983 to
protect against a state employee who negligently misplaces a package.
In this regard, see Johnson v. Miller, 680 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982). InJohnson, the plaintiff
sued for damages resulting from two arrests pursuant to two incorrectly issued arrest warrants. In affirming the dismissal of the claims, the Seventh Circuit noted that "[t]he Fourth
Amendment and section 1983 have higher objects in view than getting arresting officers to
backstop the mistakes of their superiors." Id at 42.
Although the two previously mentioned inconsistencies may appear to support the Parrail approach which limits federal actions, they actually do not. Rather, these inconsistencies
suggest that the problem caused by the volume of § 1983 actions is centered in Monroe v. Pape
and its expansive definition of "under color of law." These two inconsistencies do not advocate the Parrall solution which redefines due process for constitutional tort cases. Instead,
they create an atmosphere of uncertainty which magnifies the problems Parrall created with
respect to its scope of application and its incompatability with the rejection of an exhaustion
requirement.
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nf thee conflicts with the exhaustion requirement ques-

tion, the Court needs to reassess, or at least refine, its assumption that
due process analysis should reach past the actual deprivation and
consider possible postdeprivation remedies. Section 1983 originally
had four main purposes: 99
1) to override certain kinds of state laws;
2) to provide a remedy where state law was inadequate;
3) to provide a federal remedy where the state remedy, though
adequate in theory, was not available in practice; and
4) to provide a remedy in the federal courts supplementary to
any remedy a state might have.
Parratt's assumption that a postdeprivation hearing will satisfy due
process seems to allow the second factor to negate the fourth factor.
However, practically speaking, the fourth factor subsumes the second
and both may peacefully coexist.
III.

Should the Parrall Analysis Expand Beyond
Property Interests?

Parrall,if held strictly to its facts, only considered alleged deprivations of property interests.100 In Parratt, the plaintiff claimed that
prison employees had deprived him of hobby materials which he had
ordered. However, several courts of appeals have applied Parrall beyond the deprivation of property interests to also encompass the deprivations of both life and liberty interests. 1
The circuit courts which extend Parralt to include both life and
liberty interests often employ a two-part rationale.10 2 First, these
courts straightforwardly extend the logic of the Parrall opinion. The
logic argument focuses on whether the alleged state conduct was random and unauthorized. If this is taken as the threshold issue, then
Parralt cannot be rationally limited to property interests alone. In
Juncker v. Tinney, ° 3 Judge Young's stance exemplifies the position
taken by these courts:
The logic of Parrall permits no principled distinction between
deprivations of property and liberty interests. If a deprivation
99 MeNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668, 671-72 (1963).
100 Parfalt, 451 U.S. at 529, n.1.
101 See, e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1983); Haygood v. Younger, 718
F.2d 1472 (9th Cir. 1983); Wolf-Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1983); Johnson v.
Miller, 680 F.2d 39 (7th Cir. 1982); Ellis v. Hamilton, 669 F.2d 510 (7th Cir. 1982) cert. denied,
103 S. Ct. 488 (1982); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
102 E.g. Daniels v. Williams, 720 F.2d 792 (4th Cir. 1983).
103 549 F. Supp. 574 (D. Md. 1982).
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results from a "random and unauthorized act" by a state official,
the State is no more able to predict the deprivation, and a predeprivation hearing is no more possible, when the deprivation
involves1 0 a4 liberty interest than when it involves a property
interest.

Based only on the logic of Parratt, life and liberty interests join property interests in being amenable to the Parrall analysis.
The second rationale for extending Parratt is found in Ingraham v.
Wrghl, 10 5 a case cited by Parratt with approval.10 6 Ingraham applied
a Parratt-like analysis to the liberty interest implicated by corporal
punishment in schools. 10 7 The Ingraham Court found no deprivation
of liberty without due process because the traditional state common
law remedies for personal injury were sufficient to satisfy the due
process requirements.10 As in Parratt, these common law remedies
were postdeprivation, providing relief only after the state injured the
plaintiff. The courts that use Ingraham to extend Parratt use a pure
syllogism: Ingraham applied a Parratt-likeanalysis to a liberty interest, and Parratt followed the Ingraham decision, therefore, the Parralt
Court intended its analysis to apply to liberty interests as well as
property interests. The syllogism is sound; however, its broad application may be somewhat weakened by the facts of Ingraham. Ingraham concerned corporal punishment in schools, an area which the
Ingraham Court admitted to be a special circumstance in common
law history. 0 9
Arguing against this expansionist movement, Justice White and
Justice Blackmun, concurring in Pan-att, understood that Parratt
would not apply to cases concerning deprivations of life or liberty. 10
Unfortunately, neither of the Justices explained the rationale for this
position. Some courts of appeals have also limited Parrattto property
interests."' But, they too have not explained why they have imposed
104 Id at 576.
105 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
106 Parratt,451 U.S. at 542.
107 Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 672.
108 Id
109 Id at 660-63, 674-75.
110 "I do not read the Court's opinion as applicable to a case concerning, deprivation of
life or of liberty." Parfalt, 451 U.S. at 545 (Blackmun, J. concurring).
I11 See, e.g., Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1983); Brewer v.
Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1982); Wakinekona v. Olim, 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981),
reo'don other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983). See also, Beard v. O'Neal, Nos. 82-1893; 82-2096
(7th Cir. filed Feb. 22, 1984) (Swygert, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Parrattshould not apply
to deprivations of life interests).
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this restriction. For example, in Wakinekona v. Om ,s112 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit relied simply on Justice Blackmun's
concurring opinion, without explanation, as support for limiting Parrat. 113 This unembellished reliance seems misguided since a majority of the Court adopted the Parrat opinion without Blackmun's
restriction. 114

However, there is a means to add some substance to the concurring opinions in Parratt. American jurisprudence traditionally recognizes that property interests, while worthy of protection, should in
times of exigency acquiesce more readily than liberty or life interests.
In essence, there seems to be a hierarchy of constitutionally protected
interests. Passages from two Supreme Court decisions suggest this
hierarchy. In Mitchell v. W.T Grant Co. '115 a case dealing with state
replevin statutes, the Court stated that "[t]he usual rule has been
'[w]here only property rights are involved, mere postponement of the
judicial enquiry is not a denial of due process, if the opportunity
given for ultimate judicial determination is adequate.' "116 In Parratt,
the Court quoted this passage with approval.1 7 Additionally, in Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining and Reclamation,118 the Court discussed a
provision of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act which
allowed immediate cessation orders if the mining operation created
immediate danger to health and safety." 19 In upholding the orders,
the Court stated: "It is sufficient, where only property rights are concerned
that there is at some stage an opportunity for a hearing and a judicial
'20

determination."'

Thus, the bare words of the concurring opinions in Parratt can
be made meaningful by reading them in light of this traditional hierarchy of constitutional interests. This hierarchy suggests that due
process may be delayed until after the deprivation only when property interests are involved; no delay is permissible for either life or
112 664 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 103 S. Ct. 1741 (1983).
113 Id. at 715.
114 See Haygood, 718 F.2d at 1479. The property "limitation appeared neither in the
Court's opinion, which commanded five votes in addition to those of Justices White and
Blackmun, nor in the concurrence of Justice Stewart, one of those who joined the majority.
Moreover, Justice Blackmun provided no rationale for the limitation he suggested." Id
115 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
116 Id at 611.
117 Parralt, 451 U.S. at 540.
118 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
119 Id. at 298.
120 Id. at 303 (quoting Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594, 599 (1950))
(emphasis added).
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liberty interests. This subordination of property interests supports a
limited application of Parrat to its facts.
The argument for limiting Parralt to property interests is
stronger than the argument in support of expansion. However, these
opposing views can be reconciled by recognizing the property limitation as a traditional threshold question reached one step before the
Parra/I analysis, thus accommodating both Parratt and the hierarchy
of constitutional interests. The Court's willingness to expand Ingraham beyond its admittedly unique factual circumstance remains the
only incalculable variable.
Should Intentional Acts Fall Within the Parralt Analysis?
The Parralt opinion dealt solely with deprivations resulting from
negligent conduct.' 2 1 In fact, Parrattrepresents the first time that the
Supreme Court held negligent conduct sufficient to state a claim
under section 1983.122 However, as with the property interest issue,
the concurring opinions in Parratt, by rejecting the extension of the
Parat analysis to intentional conduct, have created conflict among
23
the lower federal courts.
The courts which would extend Parratt to intentional conduct
use an argument similar to that used by the courts extending Parratt
beyond property interests.124 They rely on the straightforward logic
of Parratt and its focus on whether the state action was random and
unauthorized. In Palmer v. Hudson, 25 the Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit said that "once it is assumed that a postdeprivation
remedy can cure an unintentional but negligent act causing injury,
inflicted by a state agent which is unamenable to prior review, then
that principle applies as well to random and unauthorized intentional acts."' 126 This position correctly recognizes that "intentional"
IV.

121 Pan-alt, 451 U.S. at 530. After this note had been written, the United States Supreme
Court handed down its decision in Hudson v. Palmer, 104 S. Ct. 3194 (1984). In Hudson, the
Court extended the Parratt analysis to intentionaldeprivations of property.
122 Id. at 534.
123 Justices Blackmun and White argue that Parratt should be limited to negligent conduct only. See id at 545-46.
124 See,e.g., Vicory v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983); Palmer v. Hudson, 697 F.2d
1220 (4th Cir. 1983); Rutledge v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 660 F.2d 1345 (9th Cir. 1981).
125 697 F.2d 1220 (4th Cir. 1983).
126 Id at 1222. The Palmer court further stated:
Parratt's scope cannot easily be limited to negligent deprivations of property. For, if
the underlying principle is, as Justice Rehnquist stated in a plurality opinion, that
when no practical way to provide a predeprivation hearing exists, a postdeprivation
hearing will satisfy the dictates of procedural due process, then it as well applies to
an intentional deprivation for which meaningful prior review was impractical.
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refers to the state of mind of the actor at the time of the act, 12 7 but
does not alter the characterization of the act as random and unauthorized. 128 As such, Parrati may apply to intentional acts.
Some courts refuse to extend Parratt beyond negligent acts. 129
One rationale suggested for this limitation is that intentional acts, by
definition, cannot be random and unauthorized. 130 This position
finds support in Justice Blackmun's concurring opinion where he
mentioned that "[w]hile the 'random and unauthorized' nature of
negligent acts by state employees makes it difficult for the State to
'provide a meaningful hearing before the deprivation takes place,' it
is rare that the same can be said of intentional acts by state employees."' 13 1 This position seems erroneous. To suggest that intentional
conduct cannot be "random and unauthorized" in the Parratt sense
presupposes a detachment on the part of state agents which probably
does not exist. The individual committing the harm cannot divorce
himself from his conduct and act like a third party state representative whose notice defeats the "random and unauthorized" threshold.
When Parrattis read in light of Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. ,132 it
seems that "random and unauthorized" events are those events not
carried out pursuant to an "established state procedure."' 133 As such,
even if one were to assume that intentional acts are premeditated,
that does not impart to the state sufficient knowledge and complicity
to qualify the acts as pursuant to an "established state procedure."
For example, battery is an intentional tort. 3 4 But it is ridiculous to
contend that an intentional battery will always lend itself to
127

W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 30 (4th ed. 1971).

128 Id. The act's random character with respect to state government planning is unrelated
to the actor's state of mind. However, this should be read together with notes 141-46 infia and
accompanying text.
129 See Vail v. Board of Educ., 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983); Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d
1320 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 725 (1983).
130 See Vail, 706 F.2d at 1441. The Vail court suggests that intentional acts cannot be
random and unauthorized. In refusing to extend Parratt to intentional acts, the court said:
"The Supreme Court had the opportunity but refused to expand Parrattbeyond 'a tortious
loss of property or result of a random and unauthorized act by a state employee.' " Id.
131 Parfat, 451 U.S. at 546.
132 455 U.S. 422 (1982). See note 51 supra.
133 Logan, see note 132 supra, creates a universe of state actions which seems to have only
two sets. One set consists of all activities accomplished through an established state procedure. The other set consists of those activities which are not pursuant to an established state
procedure. Although random and unauthorized activities fall within the second set, it has not
yet been determined whether "random and unauthorized" defines the entire content of the
second set.
134 W. PROSSER, supra note 127, at 34.
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predeprivation process or never be "random and unauthorized."13 5
Thus, by focusing on the logic of Parratt and identifying "random
and unauthorized" as the threshold issue, intentional conduct seems
to fall within the scrutiny of the Parralt approach. However, whether
the alleged conduct is negligent or intentional, the postdeprivation
remedies must still satisfy due process. With either type of conduct,
if a meaningful chance for a predeprivation hearing existed, that fact
alone may defeat the adequacy and appropriateness of the
36
postdeprivation remedy and thus render Parralt inapplicable.
A better argument exists to limit Parrall to negligent actions.
There is a belief firmly rooted in the common law that intentional
acts are more grave than negligent acts.137 Intentional acts, therefore,
have been given stricter judicial treatment. This distinction in treatment is seen in common law tort actions. For example, courts can
award nominal damages for intentional trespass even if the only
harm has been a theoretical violation of the owner's sovereignty over
his land.13 But with negligence actions, a plaintiff must show actual
damages in order to recover. 39 Given this inherent distinction, a
federal court in a section 1983 action may be able to justify retaining
the allegedly intentional government actions within its jurisdiction.
If nothing else, this will enhance the credibility of the judiciary because if a state agent purposefully inflicts harm on a citizen, the state
itself will not be the sole arbiter of the citizen's claim. In fact, we
have come full circle since this result was one of the original goals of
section 1983.140

Unfortunately, the opposing views on the intentional conduct
question cannot be meshed as easily as the views on Parratts exten135 The proposition is ridiculous because the state agent committing the tort has neither
the time nor the detachment from his actions necessary to provide or initiate predeprivation

process.
136 See notes 40-45 supra and accompanying text.
137 See W. PROSSER, supra note 127, at 9-11. In discussing punitive damages, Prosser
noted:
Something more than the mere commission of a tort is always required for punitive
damages. There must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or
"malice," or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of the defendant, or such a
conscious and deliberate disregard of the interests of others that his conduct may be
called wilful or wanton. Lacking this element, there is general agreement that mere
negligence is not enough, even though it is so extreme in degree as to be characterized as "gross."
Id at 9-10 (footnotes omitted).
138 Id at 66.
139 Id at 143-44.
140 See note 99 supra and accompanying text.
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sion to liberty interests. The logic of Parratt apparently allows a
broad interpretation. The resolution of this issue will turn on the
weight an individual court gives the common law concept that intentional conduct requires stricter judicial treatment.
Finally, some courts confuse the distinction between "random
and unauthorized" conduct and conduct which is pursuant to an "established state procedure." This confusion arose in Vail v. Board of
Education, 4 1 where the defendant school board dismissed the plaintiff, an athletic coach, after one year. The plaintiff sued under section 1983, claiming a property deprivation because he had been
promised employment for at least two years when hired. 142 The
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit affirmed a district court
award in the action. However, the concurring and dissenting opinions in Vail argued whether intentional acts, like the school board's
decision to fire the plaintiff, should be included within the Parralt
analysis. The concurring judge felt that intentional acts should not
be included; therefore, the plaintiff's section 1983 action could continue because Parrall did not apply. 4 3 The dissenting judge felt that
this was an artificial and incorrect construction of Parralt.144
Much of this debate about intentional conduct is unnecessary.
At least one circuit has characterized the type of conduct in Vail as
conduct pursuant to an established state procedure.' 4 5 This "established state procedure" is the result of "decisions made by officials
with final authority over significant matters."' 46 The disagreement
over Parratt's applicability to intentional conduct, then, need not be
clouded by these issues, since Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co. effectively
removed them from Parratt-s consideration.
V.

Suggestions for Practitioners

Two suggestions with respect to the use of Parralt and section
1983 actions may prove helpful to practitioners. The first suggestion
concerns the requirement that a section 1983 plaintiff affirmatively
plead the absence of an adequate state remedy. The second suggestion offers a step-by-step Parralt analysis which may prevent mis141 706 F.2d 1435 (7th Cir. 1983).
142 Id at 1436.
143 Id. at 1448.
144 Id at 1455.
145 See Burtnieks v. City of New York, 716 F.2d 982 (2d Cir. 1983); see also Vail, 706 F.2d
at 1448.
146 Burtnieks, 716 F.2d at 988.
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placed time and resources in federal court when only the state courts
are available.
A.

The Need To Affirmatively Plead The Absence of An Adequate State
Remedy

Vicoy v. Walton,'14 7 a recent Sixth Circuit case, held that in suits
for deprivation of property without procedural due process, the
plaintiff has the burden of pleading and proving the inadequacy of
available state processes. t 48 Thus, the plaintiff has a dual burden;
not only must he prove wrongful state conduct, but he must also
prove the inadequacy of the state's corrective procedure. 149
Vicoy applies to a deprivation of property, whether or not that
deprivation resulted from intentional or negligent conduct.' 50 However, since PViog dealt only with property interests, plaintiffs would
presumably not have to plead the inadequacy of state remedies in
cases involving deprivations of either liberty or life interests. However, in these non-property circumstances, and in circuits other than
the Sixth, the risk of not affirmatively pleading inadequate state process far outweighs any possible benefit. The Vicoiy decision did not
simply warn future plaintiffs as to the section 1983 pleading procedure; it reversed an award specifically because the inadequacy of
state remedies was not pleaded or proved.' 5 1 Therefore, until the issue receives future consideration, Vicoy functionally notifies all section 1983 due process plaintiffs that pleading the inadequacy of state
remedies is required.
B.

The Proper Parratt Anayszs

The Parrall analysis only applies to procedural due process allegations. If the action states a claim based on substantive due process,
Parrall does not apply. 152 Once a procedural due process claim is
asserted, the threshold question becomes whether the deprivation occurred through an established state procedure. If the deprivation so
occurred, Parratt does not apply. 153 The court then need only apply
the standard due process test as found in Matthews v. Eldidge'5 4 to
147
148
149
150
151
152
153
154

721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983).
Id at 1063.
Id at 1066.
Id. at 1065.
Id. at 1066.
See Palmer, 697 F.2d at 1225; see also Parrall,451 U.S. at 535-36.
Logan, 455 U.S. at 436.
424 U.S. 319 (1976). Matthews v. Eldridge presents a three prong balancing test which
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determine the sufficiency of the predeprivation process.1 55 If the deprivation did not occur as a result of an established state procedure,
the Parralt analysis applies.
Only random and unauthorized acts fall within Parratts cover1
age. 56 The plaintiff must then determine which additional actions
his particular circuit has exempted from the Parratt analysis. For ex157
ample, the Ninth Circuit may eliminate intentional state acts,
while the Fifth Circuit would exclude liberty interests.158 Only if an
action survives these hurdles can a court appropriately apply the Parratt approach. If Parratt does apply, a court would then use the standard three-prong Matthews v. Eldridge balancing test 59 to determine
the sufficiency of the full range of process, both predeprivation and
postdeprivation, which the state affords.
VI.

Conclusion

Parratt created three difficulties with respect to section 1983 actions. First, the Parratt decision cannot be reconciled with the
Supreme Court's numerous rejections of an exhaustion requirement
for section 1983 actions. Additionally, the Parratt decision runs contrary to both the letter and the spirit of the legislative history of section 1983. Second, a question remains as to whether Parratt may be
extended beyond property interests. The straightforward logic of
Parratt does not reflect any limitation which would exclude life and
liberty interests from its analysis. However, a hierarchy of constitutional values firmly set in American jurisprudence allocates to property interests alone a special, albeit subordinate position. This
hierarchy may override Parratt, or at least become a threshold inquiry before reaching the Parratt analysis. Finally, it is not clear
whether Parratt should apply to intentional conduct as well as negligent conduct. Again, the logic of Parratt shows no limitation. The
weighs: 1) the private interest that will be affected, 2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of
that interest by the procedures being used, and 3) the government's interest in the matter. Id
at 335.
155 In Logan, the Court foreclosed any consideration of postdeprivation process in cases
where the deprivation occurred pursuant to an established state procedure.
156 The act need be either random and unauthorized or incapable of predeprivation process. See notes 44 and 49 supra and accompanying text. It has not been settled whether these
two classifications are coterminous. Although "random and unauthorized" may encompass
the remainder set after the "established state procedure" actions have been removed from the
universe of state conduct, this issue has not been determined. See note 133 supra.
157 See Weiss v. Lehman, 676 F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 103 S. Ct. 725 (1983).
158 See Brewer v. Blackwell, 692 F.2d 387 (5th Cir. 1982).
159 See note 154 supra.
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best argument limiting Parratt to negligent conduct arises from the
development of common law torts. Since intentional conduct is
treated more strictly than negligent conduct in the common law, by
analogy intentional conduct in section 1983 actions should also be
treated more strictly by retaining it within federal jurisdiction.
The persuasiveness of the exhaustion requirement, the property
interest issues, and the uncertainty in the negligent/intentional conduct question suggest a limited application of the Parrall decision.
Until the Supreme Court clarifies its position, a broad application of
Parratl destroys much of the legislative intent behind section 1983
and erodes doctrines firmly rooted in American jurisprudence.
Timothy M. Maggio

